If convergence to full employment is so slow, it is argued, it might as well be ignored. So the explanation of this era is the central challenge to monetarist or dynamic economists. Despite inmense theoretical and empirical effort, no real answer has been given. This paper argues that the inability of monetarist models to explain such large, persistent unemployment rates is an asset, because those unemployment rates did not in fact exist. The previously reported unemployment rates include among the unemployed literally millions of employees on the payrolls of government emergency relief projects such as the Works Progress Administration and the Civilian Conservation Corps. On neither modern search theory nor Keynesian grounds should contracyclical government employment be counted instead as unemployment.
*Agsocjate Professor of Economics, University of California, Los Angeles, and Harry Scherman Research Fellow, National Bureau of Economic Research. The author hopes that Bob Gordon will forgive the obvious recycling of his original (1969) title and that this recycling does not seriously reduce the total stock of titles (see Darby, 1973) .
Perceptive questioning by James C. Lothian and comments by Anna Schwartz wrested the admission that my theoretical framework could not explain the high unemployment rates of 1934 through 1941 unless millions of people were gainfully employed as "unemployed." Thinking of generous unemployment insurance, I had no idea that my hyperbole would prove literally correct. Mrs. Schwartz's incomparable knowledge of data resources provided the key references. The regression was run on the NBER's Troll system by Nurhan Helvacian.
The Standard Treatment of Emergency Workers
There are two standard data sets for the labor force, employment, and unemployment from 1929 through 1943: the official Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) data and the Lebergott data taken from Stanley Lebergott's book (1964) . Either series could be called the "Lebergott data" since the original presentation of the BLS data is in Lebergott (1948) .2 Though both standard data sets thus can be attributed to Lebergott, the treatment of "emergency workers" as unemployed was standard practice in the estimates of that period.3 Lebergott (1948) "for relief and work relief to needy and distressed people and in relieving the hardships resulting from unemployment."7 Work under these programs was generally for a few hours per week and could hardly be said to constitute employment. So it was certainly a reasonable decision to count these recipients of work relief as unemployed rather than as government employees. Note however that the national S income accounts do treat these as wage rather than transfer payments. Besides bureaucratic inertia which carried forward the earlier treatment of state rk-relIef recipients, the misclassification of emergency workers can be attributed to an implicit definition of unemployment as the difference between the normal labor force and those employed in normal jobs. The pioneering estimates by the National Industrial Conference Board (NTCB) aimed at estimating how many jobs would have to be created in order to get back to a normal situation 5 of no depression and therefore no emergency government labor force. Measuring jobs-to-be-created leads to different treatment than measuring people without work who are seeking it)' Of course, no consideration was given to emergency employment's crowding-out private employment or the state and local construction work which it replaced.
In sununary, counting state work-relief recipients as unemployed was justif led by the facts12-. they had both time and incentive to search for alternative employment. Counting members of the emergency government labor force as unemployed represents a major conceptual error)3
It. Corrected Estimates for [1929] [1930] [1931] [1932] [1933] [1934] [1935] [1936] [1937] [1938] [1939] [1940] [1941] [1942] [1943] It is straightforward to correct the BLS and Lebergott data for the misclassification of emergency workers. Both the standard and corrected data are presented in Table 2 . Comparing the standard'4 and corrected unemployment figures in cOlumns (12) and (13) (1) whole-hearted compliance with the law and codes; (2) a change in firms' reporting practices-entirely legal-so as to eliminate inclusion of rest and meal breaks in reported hours; and (3) falsification of reported hours and wages as part of an evasion scheme. A cynical economist such as the author might suspect that the data primarily reflect items (2) and (3), but this is clearly a topic for detailed historical research.2° If the change in hours is largely spurious, average earnings per full-time equivalent employee would more accurately reflect the development of wages in the 1930's.
In any case, traditional models of search have used "the wage" as a shorthand expression for total conditions of employment. This concept would appear to be better represented by annual earnings of full-time workers-or of all employees-in a period in which total hours are being rationed.
In view of these questions concerning the use of reported hourly wages, equation (1) was estimated for 1930 to 1941 using the corrected Lebergott unemployment rate, average annual earnings per full-time employee, and the GNP price deflator for Ut, W and P, respectively.21 The anticipated levels of wages and prices were estimated by a simple adaptive expectations formulation:
Here , is the coefficient of adjustment and g1 and g2 are the trend growth rates of wages and prices. 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 0The conditions of the major programs are summarized in Appendices 2 through 5 of the National Resources Planning Board (1942). Wages were generally set at "prevailingt' or "fair" levels for the skill class of the work, or at minimum rates where higher than the market wage.
1On this view, employment can exceed the "normal" labor force and negative unemployment is reported as in 1906 , 1917 -1919 , and 1942 -1944 . NICB (1965 . Milton Friedman suggested it might be interesting to compute the unemployment rate for the postwar era on the definition of unemployment as job-seekers plus employees of "make-work" jobs. Unfortunately it is much easier to estimate which make-work employees were counted as unemployed in the 1930's than to estimate the number of postwar government (and private?) employees on make-work jobs.
a strict application of the modern definition, which Counts part-time workers, would include these people as employed.
'3A word of warning should be given about the Census Bureau data on the duration of unemployment. These too should be taken with a large grain of salt because "Etihe duration of unemployment represents the length of time (up to March 30, 1940) during which these persons had been seeking work or working on public (Denison, ).
Unfortunately Lucas and Rapping (1969, p. 742, n. 27 ) had misinterpreted their (secondary) source as reporting "annual hours worked per year by full-time employees"
when it in fact reports "actual average annual hours per employee" as is seen in the original presentation by James Knowles (p. 26 [1929] [1930] [1931] [1932] [1933] to minimum wage unemployment (1934) (1935) (1936) (1937) (1938) (1939) (1940) (1941) (1941, 1945) .
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